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More Behavioral vs. More Economic
Approach: Explaining the Behavioral




While U.S. courts and regulatory agencies have set sail towards
what may be dubbed a "more behavioral approach," their European
counterparts still navigate the charted waters of a neoclassical "more
economic approach," as first advocated in E.U. competition law.
This paper claims that this "behavioral divide" can be explained by a
theory of social norms and expectations.
Two decisive factors drive the behavioral divide: first, the trust a
society places in the self-ordering forces of individual and market
behavior (ts); and second, the degree to which each individual is
supposed to contribute to a cognitively demanding collective social
project (cs), such as the construction of an internal market in the E.U.
A high score on either variable in this model leads to the adoption of
a more rational concept of human agency. Historical changes in the
social norms and expectations expressed by these variables can be
credited for the inverse tendencies in the U.S. and the E.U.
Arguably, the more individualistic social conception of the U.S.
leads to a greater sensitivity to empirical, i.e., behavioral findings.
* Scientific Assistant and Ph.D. candidate, Humboldt University of Berlin; LL.M., Yale Law
School. This paper benefitted from comments by Georgios Dimitropoulos, Stefan Eich,
Stefan Grundmann, Bilyana Petkova, Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Norman I. Silber, Max
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and the Private Law Forum of the European University Institute. I am particularly grateful
to Christine Jolls for detailed comments and conversations. Sebastian Naturski, Cuineyd
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By contrast, the European political project has long been driven by
the construction of an ever closer union on the basis of a single
market. This overriding goal could significantly inhibit the long-
term prospects of behavioral law and economics in the practice of
European law.
Other factors play a lesser role in the explanation of the
behavioral divide: diverging mandatory risk regulation, differences
in legal education, and the distinct political economy of nudging.
The latter refers to the potential of bridging otherwise
insurmountable political differences in times of political institutional
gridlock by behaviorally informed legal strategies. However, this
may well prove a potent force in the future if the E.U. continues on
its deplorable path to an ever greater political and ideological divide.
This political dimension may thus cut against the current move
toward more rational models of human agency in E.U. law.
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I. Introduction
Behavioral law and economics has entered the global stage. It
embellishes the latest reports of the World Bank;' the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) intends to tap
its power;2 and numerous national governments are vigorously
embracing it. 3 Born out of the happy trilateral merger of cognitive
psychology, experimental economics, and the law,4 behavioral law
and economics has come to dominate the legal discourse in the U.S.
in the last decade.5 Today, it is increasingly discussed in legal
academia in the E.U. as well.6 Strikingly, however, a closer look at
the concrete implementation of behavioral insights into case law and
decisions by regulatory agencies reveals a wide gap between the U.S.
1. WORLD BANK, MIND, SOCIETY, AND BEHAVIOR. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
(2015).
2. PETE LUNN, REGULATORY POLICY AND BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS (OECD Publ'g,
2014).
3. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1349 (2011) (for the U.S.); see, e.g., NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
(Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015) (for the E.U.); see also Bennhold,
infra note 70.
4. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. LAW. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998); see, e.g., Russell
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2000); see, e.g., Jon
D. Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); see, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics and the Law, 6 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 173 (2011).
5. Cf Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2014).
6. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Klaus
Mathis ed., 2015) (for monographic treatments of the topic in the E.U.); see, e.g., Alemanno
& Sibony, supra note 3; see, e.g., Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, Grenzen der Selbstbindung im
Pivatrecht [LIMITS OF SELF-BINDING IN PRIVATE LAW] (2014); see, e.g., Stefan Bechtold,
Die Grenzen zwingenden Vertragsrechts [THE LIMITS OF MANDATORY CONTRACT LAW]
(2010); see, e.g., Philipp Hacker, Verhaltens6konomik und Normativitat [BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND NORMATIVITY] (forthcoming 2016); Lars Kl6hn, Kapitalmarkt, Spekulation
und Behavioral Finance [SPECULATION AND BEHAVIORAL FINANCE] (2006); see, e.g., Recht
und Verhalten: Beitrage zu Behavioral Law and Economics [LAW AND BEHAVIOR:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS] (Christoph Engel, Markus Englerth,
J~rn Lildemann and Indra Spiecker genannt D6hmann eds., 2007); see, e.g., Barbara Luppi
& Francesco Parisi, Beyond Liability: Correcting Optimism Bias Through Tort Law, 35
QUEENS L. J. 47, 47-66 (2009); see, e.g., Lars Klahn, Preventing Excessive Retail Investor
Trading under MiFID: A Behavioral Law and Economics Perspective, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
R. 437 (2009); Michael G. Faure, Calabresi and Behavioural Tort Law and Economics, 1
ERASMUS L. R. 75 (2008).
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and the E.U.-the "behavioral divide."' In the U.S., adjudication by
courts and regulatory agencies progressively takes behavioral
insights and bounded rationality into account. This may be dubbed a
"more behavioral approach." On the contrary, E.U. courts and
agencies still, and even increasingly, cling to the rational actor
model. Borrowing a term from competition law,8 this may be called
the "more economic approach."9 These differences can be unearthed
by scrutinizing legal concepts of human agency, i.e., those elements
of a legal order that, implicitly or explicitly, refer to models of
rationality in human action. Such an in-depth analysis is undertaken
in a companion paper which establishes the behavioral divide by
comparing a host of court rulings and decisions by administrative
agencies from both sides of the Atlantic.10 These findings can only
be sketched here and not be repeated in detail; the behavioral divide
is thus taken as a given.
Rather, this paper sets out to explore the reasons for these
opposite tendencies reigning in the U.S. and the E.U.: It claims that
the behavioral divide can be explained by a theory of social norms
and expectations.' The antagonistic currents in the U.S. and the
E.U. can possibly be traced back to differential conceptions of the
7. Philipp Hacker, The Behavioral Divide: A Critique of the Differential
Implementation of Behavioral Law and Economics in the U.S. and the E. U., 11 EUR. REV.
CONT. L. 299 (2015).
8. COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH - FOUNDATIONS AND
LIMITATIONS (Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber & Rupprecht Podszun eds. 2011) (on the more
economic approach in competition law).
9. Since rational choice theory and the neoclassical rational actor model traditionally
underpins much of economic analysis, the term "Economic Approach" seems appropriate to
capture neoclassical, rationally oriented thinking; cf, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998); Robert
Sugden, Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy, 101
ECON. J. 751 (1991). It should be noted that behavioral economics, as is apparent from its
title, also remains indebted to economic thought, but to a modified version which has come
to be known under the label "behavioral"; see Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony, The
Emergence of Behavioural Policy-Making: A European Perspective, in NUDGE AND THE
LAW. A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1, 5-10 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds.,
2015) (for a critical perspective on these labels).
10. Hacker, supra note 7.
11. On social norms, see, e.g., the path breaking work of Eugen Ehrlich, Grundlegung
der Soziologie des Rechts [FOUNDATION OF LEGAL SOCIOLOGY] 31-48 (Duncker &
Humblot, 1913); see ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) (for a law and
economics perspective); see Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social
Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO IURIS 260 (2009) (for a systems
theoretic approach).
358 [Vol. 39:2
More Behavioral vs. More Economic Approach
relationship between the individual and collective social goals. Two
variables, t and c, are singled out as decisive elements in a simple
model: the trust a society places in the self-correcting forces of the
market (ts); and the degree to which society is engaged in a cognitively
demanding collective social project (cs), such as the construction of an
internal market in the E.U. This paper argues that, while the more
individualistic social conception of the U.S. engenders a greater
sensitivity to empirical (behavioral) findings, the European political
project consisting in the construction of an ever closer union on the
basis of a single market is primarily responsible for the so far
diminished significance of bounded rationality in legal analysis in
Europe. Further variables-such as the degree of mandatory risk
regulation, the political economy of nudging, and differences in legal
education-have only a reduced impact on the behavioral divide.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part II briefly introduces the
differences between standard concepts of full and bounded rationality
as well as some methodological problems related to behavioral
economics. Part III succinctly explores the implications of behavioral
economics for legal concepts of human agency and explains the
behavioral divide. Part IV discusses legal concepts of human agency
as functions of social norms and expectations, offering an explanation
for the differential application of behavioral economics to legal
contexts in the U.S. and the E.U. Part V concludes.
II. A Very Short Primer on Behavioral Economics
A. Core Concepts
Behavioral economics has significantly transformed legal theory
in the last two decades. It combines cognitive psychology and
experimental economics in its empirical approach to human decision
making. Four distinctive parts of behavioral economics may be
discerned: bounded rationality, bounded willpower, bounded self-
interest, and cognitive capacity limits.'2
12. Richard Thaler, Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus, FOUNDATIONS OF
RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS: How Do ECONOMISTS Do ECONOMICS? 227 (Steven G. Medema
& Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996) (the distinction between bounded rationality, bounded
willpower and bounded self-interest was established by Richard Thaler). Cognitive capacity
limits are often studied in cognitive psychology rather than in economics. Nevertheless, they
form an integral part of the behavioral understanding of decision-making.
3592016]
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Bounded rationality refers to cognitive biases (judgments errors,
biased perceptions) that depart from Expected Utility Theory, the
epitome of Rational Choice Theory in economics.13 The leading
theoretical formulation of bounded rationality is (Cumulative)
Prospect Theory,14 developed by Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman. Four main insights of Prospect Theory can be singled
out." First, decision making depends on a reference point.16 People
tend not to evaluate total welfare levels, but rather relative changes in
the status quo. Second, when agents deliberate whether to incur the
risk of losses for a chance of gains, "losses loom larger than gains,""
i.e., are weighted more heavily. Third, actors are risk averse when
making decisions between gains and risk seeking between losses.1 8
Fourth, large probabilities tend to be underweighted and small ones
overweighted.19 An ever increasing host of other biases has been
described along the lines of Prospect Theory.20 Among them are such
widely known phenomena as optimism bias,21 confirmation bias,2 2
13. See, e.g., Paul J. H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants,
Purposes, Evidence and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 529 (1982) (on Expected
Utility Theory).
14. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory, An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances
in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
297 (1992).
15. Cf Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review
and Assessment (NBER Working Paper 18621 4) (2012).
16. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277 (1979); see Botond K6szegi & Matthew Rabin, A
Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 121 Q. J. EcoN. 1133 (2006) (new insights
point to a rational expectations model for the determination of the reference point).
17. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 14, at 279.
18. See Matthew Rabin, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk
Aversion, CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 202 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000).
19. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 14, at 283..
20. See HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, Thomas
Gilovich, (Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (for a comprehensive overview of
the heuristics and biases literature); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin E.
Camerer, George Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin eds., 2003); HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Morris Altman ed., 2006).
21. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein,
Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin &
Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
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and the availability heuristic.2 3
Bounded willpower denotes the incapacity to adhere to one's
plans.2 4 When making a decision, people often exhibit a present bias,
which leads to a preference of immediate gratification over long-run
maximization. This can entail preference reversals25 and time-
inconsistent choice,26 phenomena which stand in stark contrast to the
assumption of stable preferences in many economic models and in
Expected Utility Theory.
Bounded self-interest departs from the assumption that only self-
interest drives economic behavior. A host of studies in experimental
economics have demonstrated that people do, indeed, care about
other-regarding norms such as fairness and are willing to make
monetary sacrifices to enforce them, e.g., in the so-called ultimatum
game. 27
Furthermore, the capacity to process any amount of information
in a given time period is limited. Thus, even if the abovementioned
phenomena did not exist, not all information with which we are
confronted would enter our working memory.2 8 The concept of
limited cognitive processing capacity is simple: Once all cognitive
22. Charles Lord, Mark R. Lepper & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the Opposite: A
Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1984)
(calling the effect "biased assimilation of new evidence"); Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon i  Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175
(1998).
23. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); Baruch Fischhoff, Paul
Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Estimated Failure Probabilities to
Problem Representation, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
330 (1978); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning:
The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983).
24. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J.
ECON. 443 (1997) (developing what has come to be called the -I-model of quasi-
hyperbolic discount functions which describes time-inconsistent choices, with - measuring
the extent of present bias).
25. Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 596 (1983); Laibson, supra note 24.
26. Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002).
27. Werner Gtith, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 367 (1982); see Ernst Fehr &
Simon Gichter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics ofReciprocity, 14 J. EcON. PERSP.
159 (2000).
28. Alan Baddeley, Working Memory: Theories, Models, and Controversies, 63 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 15 (2012) (the groundbreaking work on working memory).
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channels of information processing are used, any additional piece of
information provokes information overload.29 The result is a marked
deterioration of decision quality.30 Cognitive psychology has
revealed that the human working memory, which actively processes
information, has a fairly limited storage capacity. Miller, in a
celebrated essay from 1956, suggested the magical number seven as
the maximum number of units one's brain can simultaneously
process.31 Today, these insights have been largely been vindicated. 32
The capacity limit depends on the specific task. However, it often
lies around four units of information.33 The largest reported numbers
in some consumer choice situations vary between ten and fifteen.34
Despite disagreement on concrete numbers, cognitive psychology in
this domain paints a clear picture: Human capacities are very limited.
Finally, limited working memory can form an unholy alliance
with limits to attention. Naturally, people cannot attend to everything
all of the time. However, even when study participants pay active
attention to their environment, their capacity to detect changes in
attended objects is substantially bounded (change blindness).35 For
example, when giving directions to an experimenter on the street,
half of the subjects did not notice that the person to whom they
spoke had changed after a short, diverting incident.36 And when
29. See, e.g., Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept ofInformation Overload:
A Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and
Related Disciplines, 20 INFo. Soc'Y. 325, 326 (2004).
30. Angela Edmunds & Anne Morris, The Problem of Information Overload in
Business Organizations: a Review ofLiterature, 20 INT'L J. INFO. MGMT. 17, 19 (2000).
31. George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on
Our Capacity For Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81 (1956).
32. Robert S. Owen, Clarifying the Simple Assumption of the Information Load
Paradigm, 19 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 770, 773 (1992) (noting that evidence supports
Miller's magical number "as a rough benchmark"); see also Nelson Cowan, The Magical
Number 4 in Short-term Memory: A Reconsideration of Mental Storage Capacity, 24
BEHAV. & BRAIN Scl. 87 (2000); Alan Baddeley, Working Memory: Theories, Models, and
Controversies, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 15 (2012).
33. Cowan, supra note 32; Baddeley supra note 32, at 15.
34. Naresh K. Malbotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J.
CONSUMER RES. 419,427 (1982).
35. Pepper Williams & Daniel J. Simons, Detecting Changes in Novel, Complex Three-
dimensional Objects, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 297 (2000).
36. Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Failure to Detect Changes to People During a
Real- World Intervention, 5 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 644 (1998); video footage available
under Daniel Simmons & Daniel Levin, The Door Study, study done in 1998, https://ww
w.youtube.com/watch?v-FWSxSQsspiQ.
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specifically focusing on one feature, people are surprisingly often
unable to note the appearance of new, yet highly conspicuous
features-such as the famously "invisible" gorilla walking across a
group of basketball players (inattentional blindness).3 7 Moreover,
limited attention is all too often paired with unbridled faith in one's
attention capabilities, creating an illusion of attentiveness and
control.38
B. Problems: External Validity and Multiplicity of Biases
Taking the findings on biases and information overload at face
value, legal concepts of human agency would have to assume human
behavior to be vastly deviant from the ideal type of a homo
economicus employed in law and economics.3 9 Behavioral law and
economics scholars in recent years have drawn up an impressive
agenda of legal rules that would have to be modified if these results
were to be taken seriously. Ultimately, any norm relying on legal
concepts of rational agency would have to be inversed.4 0 However,
the case for this facile conclusion collapses under closer scrutiny.4 1
As critics have rightly pointed out,4 2 the integration of the reported
biases and cognitive limits into legal analysis requires a further level
of justification because of the inherent uncertainty of the results of
empirical scholarship. For almost every empirical study reporting a
bias in one direction, another study can be found attesting to a bias in
the opposite direction.4 3 Since a robust theory of the interaction
37. Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained
Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059 (1999); The Monkey
Business Illusion (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoKZfY.
38. CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA 7 (2010).
39. See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4, at 1473; see, e.g., Korobkin &
Ulen, supra note 4, at 1053; see, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 4, at 630.
40. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 4, at 634-35.
41. See Philipp Hacker, Overcoming the Knowledge Problem in Behavioral Law and
Economics - Bounded Rationality, Decision Theory, and Autonomy, J. L. TECH. & PUB.
POL'Y (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfim?abstractid=2632022.
42. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New
Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REv. 905 (2009); Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against
Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REv. 2,
61 (2013) ("The world of the laboratory is just too different from the world outside of it to
use laboratory experiments to predict what will happen in the outside world"); Alan
Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2015).
43. Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 42, at 951- 55.
2016] 363
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
between different biases does not exist, it is often difficult or
impossible to predict whether the relevant agents will be biased and,
if yes, in what direction. Borrowing from Hayek,44 this has been
termed the "knowledge problem" of behavioral law and economics.45
III. The Behavioral Divide: Implications for Legal Concepts
of Human Agency
Despite these limitations, one may safely claim that some people
in many situations behave as behavioral economics predicts, i.e., in a
biased, boundedly rational way. If the law, however, strives to be not
only law in books but also law in action,46 with a significant impact
in real life, it should take these findings seriously. This consequence
should hold for any jurisdiction in which the results of behavioral
economics experiments are sufficiently reliable and valid.47
Surprisingly, however, when one takes a closer look at the two
dominant legal orders of the western world, the U.S. and the E.U., a
behavioral divide emerges.48 U.S. regulatory agencies and courts
increasingly ground their concepts of human agency in bounded
rationality and behavioral economics generally. In the E.U.,
however, the inverse trend toward an ever more rational model of
agency is discernible, with only a few exceptions so far. The relevant
players driving these tendencies are courts and regulatory agencies
whose interpretative moves are, as this paper claims, informed by
overarching social norms and expectations. As noted, the behavioral
divide cannot be established in detail in this paper; rather, this task is
undertaken in a companion essay.49 The following paragraphs will
thus be restricted to a summary of the findings of this in-depth
analysis.
44. Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV.
519 (1945).
45. See supra note 42; see Hacker, supra note 41 (for a proposed solution).
46. Cf Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910).
47. See Joseph Henrich et al., Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in
15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sa. 795 (2005) (There are significant
differences as to the validity of behavioral economics theories across countries and
cultures.).
48. Hacker, supra note 7 (This part draws on Hacker, where this analysis is undertaken
in greater depth.).
49. Hacker, supra note 7.
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The behavioral divide can be neatly uncovered in the areas of
consumer law and product liability. The latter field has witnessed a
major shift of paradigms in the U.S. in the last fifty years. For
example, the consumer expectations test for product defects, which
was based on a "reasonable consumer" standard, was replaced by the
risk-utility test.5 0 Most importantly, the revised Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability explicitly refers to cognitive capacity
limits regarding the treatment of product warnings. The older
Restatement (Second) of Torts had held that "where warning is given,
the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded."5 1
This effectively installed product warnings as liability shields against
claims by damaged users.5 2 Warnings trumped design.5 3
Behavioral insights on the limits of human brain power and
attention, however, found their way into the revised Third
Restatement and changed the rules of the game. Where a reasonable
alternative design can be implemented, a simple warning no longer
suffices. Section 2, comment 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability explicitly acknowledges that "instructions and
warnings may be ineffective because users of the product may not be
adequately reached, may be likely to be inattentive or may be
insufficiently motivated to follow the instructions or heed the
warnings."5 4 Design, as it were, has come to trump warnings in the
U.S., specifically in the wake of behaviorally informed analysis of
law.
This result became apparent, and contested, in the famous Texas
Supreme Court case Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company v. Martinez.5 5
Mr. Martinez, a car mechanic, blatantly disregarded various
warnings by mounting a 16-inch tire on a 16.5-inch rim, inflating it,
and bending over the tire during the process. The tire exploded;
severely wounded, he sued the tire company. The jury awarded him
50. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700
(2003).
51. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j (1965).
52. See, e.g., Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934 (N.M. 1977); Dugan v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 447 N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Simpson v. Standard Container
Co., 527 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); see generally Howard Latin, "Good"
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193 (1994).
53. David G. Owen, Information Shields in Tort Law, in EXPLORING TORT LAw 295,
307 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
54. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product liability § 2 cmt. 1(1998).
55. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
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$17 million in actual and punitive damages;'6 the Texas Supreme
Court upheld the ruling, relying explicitly on Section 2, comment 1.57
In contrast, in the E.U., Mr. Martinez would most likely have
been barred from compensation.5 ' European courts still hold users to
a demanding model of almost full rationality, expecting them to be
vigilant and attentive and to abide by warnings. This strikingly
different concept of human agency finds its legal grounding in
Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive,59 which unmistakably
installs a consumer expectations test. The language, in fact, seems to
be copied from comments g and i of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.60 Importantly, the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) and most national courts read the
reasonable consumer parable into this consumer expectations test.61
Even in the latest round of cases, E.U. courts make use of an ever
more entrenched rational user concept.62
The same inverse tendencies can be unveiled in consumer law in
general. In the U.S., the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
champions a behavioral approach to consumer protection.63 A Social
56. Spencer H. Silverglate, The Restatement (Third) of Torts Products Liability: The
Tension Between Product Design and Product Warnings, 75 (11) FLA. B. J. 10 (2001).
57. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex. 1998).
58. Cf the strikingly similar fact pattern in Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [Higher Regional
Court] Aug. 29, 2005, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNGSREPORT [NJW-
RR] 169, 2006 (denying recovery to the plaintiff who, disregarding warnings in the
instruction manual, was severely injured when mounting onto a highly pressurized PVC
kneading machine which subsequently burst open).
59. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for
defective, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter: Product Liability Directive].
60. C.J. MILLER & R.S. GOLDBERG, PRODUCT LIABILITY 355-56 (2d ed. 2004).
61. See A v. National Blood Authority, [2001] 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.D.), paragraphs 71,
80; B v. McDonald's Restaurant Ltd, [2002] EWHC 490 (Q.B.), paragraphs 73, 77; see
MILLER & GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 356-57; Michael Brook & Ian Forrester, The use of
comparative law in A & Others v Blood Authority, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 13, 17 (Duncan Fairgrieve ed., 2005) ("reasonable expectations of the public at
large"); see Miguel Martin-Casals, Spanish product liability today-adapting to the "new"
rules, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 42, 51-52 (Duncan Fairgrieve
ed., 2005) (showing that Spanish courts have held similarly); the same holds true for
German courts, see, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal High Court], June 6, 2009,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHAU [NJW] 2952 (2952-3), 2006 (repeating the formulation
of Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive as the starting point of the analysis).
62. BGH, June 16, 2009, NJW 2952, 2009; BGH, Feb. 5, 2013, NJW 1302, 2013;
Hacker, supra note 7 (providing a detailed analysis of these, and other, cases).
63. Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at
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and Behavioral Sciences Team at the White House now supports this
approach.64 The "reasonable consumer" paradigm introduced during
the Reagan administration6 5 and advocated by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) 6 6  is thus being transformed into a more
behavioral consumer concept. In the E.U., however, the model
consumer introduced by the CJEU has come to be-and still is67_
equated with the average consumer who is reasonably well informed,
reasonably observant and circumspect-in other words, with a very
rational creature.6 8 This image also underpins the ever increasing
disclosure paradigm in European private law, which is taken to new
extremes by the Consumer Rights Directive passed in 2011. 69 The
E.U., in the domain of consumer law, has therefore set sail toward an
ever more rational concept of consumers in the realm of court and
administrative agency decisions.
A few progressive national government agencies70 and the
War with Each Other, 121 YALE L. J. 2216, 2220-2224 (2012).
64. SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES TEAM, ANNUAL REPORT (2015), https://www.w
hitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/sbst2O5annualreportfinal91415.pdf.
65. See BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS
TORTS 375 (2011).
66. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman of
the FTC, to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman of the Commission on Energy & Commerce of
the House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-de
cept.htm.
67. See, e.g., STEPHEN WEATHERILL, E.U. CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 58 (2005); Lisa
Waddington, Vulnerable and Confused: The Protection of 'Vulnerable' Consumer under
E.U. Law, 38 EUR. L. REv. 757 (2013) (noting the sparse references to vulnerable consumers
in E.U. directives).
68. E.C.J. Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide [1998] ECR 1-4657, paragraph 31; E.C.J.
Case C-303/97 Kessler Hochgewitchs [1999] ECR 1-513, paragraph 36; E.C.J. Case C-
220/98 Estie Lauder Cosmetics [2000] ECR I-117, paragraph 27; see E.C.J. Case C-220/98
Estie Lauder Cosmetics [2000] ECR 1-117, paragraph 28 (exceptions are to be found where
health is at stake); E.C.J. Case C-99/01 Linhart and Biffl [2002] ECR 1-9375, paragraphs 31,
35; see also Stefan Grundmann, European Contract Law(s) of What Colour, 2 EUR. REV.
CONT. L. 184,200 (2005).
69. See the endless lists of mandatory disclosure items in Art. 5-6 of the Directive
2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on
consumer rights, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64; See also Vanessa Mak, Standards of Protection: In
Search of the "Average Consumer" of E.U. Law in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights
Directive 19 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 25 (2011) (on the consumer concept inherent in this
directive).
70. See Katrin Bennhold, Britain's Ministry of Nudges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7 (in the
U.K., the famous Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) must be mentioned); for a relevant BIT
publication, see DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS & BEHAVIOURAL
INSIGHTS TEAM, BETTER CHOICES: BETTER DEALS. CONSUMERS POWERING GROWTH (2011),
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European Commission are revising their legal concepts of human
agency under pressure from behavioral literature.7 1 For example, the
European Commission in a recent sponsored study concluded that
behavioral sciences should play a greater role in E.U. policy
making.7 2 But so far, these new beginnings, both on the E.U. and on
the Member State level, have not significantly made their way into
court rulings or agency decisions. It is unclear whether they ever
will.
The behavioral divide thus refers to the parallel unfolding of two
inverse trends: while U.S. agencies and courts increasingly ground
their concepts of human agency in bounded rationality, the E.U.
leans toward an ever more rational model of agency. 73
http://www.datagovernor.co.uk/styled-4/downloads/files/better-choices-better-deals.pdf;
Germany, the Netherlands and France also tentatively start using behavioral insights at the
regulatory level: Alexander Neubacher, Alchemie im Kanzleramt [Alchemy in the
Chancellery], Der Spiegel, September 1, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-12897
7553.html; THE NETHERLANDS AUTHORITY FOR CONSUMERS AND MARKETS, BEHAVIOURAL
ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION POLICY, https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/1 6
10/ACM-publishes-study-into-behavioural-economics-and-competition-policy/ (June 2013);
Richard Bordenave, Eric Singler, Frangoise Waintrop & Etienne Bressoud, French
Goverment: Nudge Me Tender (2014), http://www.bva.fr/data/actuali te/actualitefiche/553/fi
chiersummary-nudgemetender-bva4f7be.pdf
71. Hacker, supra note 7, at 313-16 (A detailed account of this development is provided);
see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS APPLIED TO POLICY. EUROPEAN
REPORT 2016, JRC 100146 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/even t/conference/biap-2016.
72. Ren6 van Bavel, et al., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES
TO EU POLICY-MAKING, JCR SCIENTIFIC & POLICY REPORTS, EUR 26033 EN 3 (2013); see
also case studies conducted by the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers, http://
ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer evidence/behavioural research/indexen.htm; Microsoft,
COMP/C-3/37.792 232 recital 870 (2004); Microsoft (Tying), COMP/C-3/39.53010-12
(2009) (including some behavioral references in two Commission antitrust decisions).
73. See also Alemanno & Sibony, supra note 9, at 20-21 ("As a (mass) producer of
regulation, the E.U. is as yet making scarce use of behavioural insights. Besides a few
isolated initiatives displaying some behavioural consideration [...] the E.U. has not yet
shown a general commitment to integrate behavioural research into policy-making"); Anne-
Lise Sibony, Can E. U Consumer Law Benefit rom Behavioural Insights? An Analysis of
the Unfair Practices Directive, 22 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 901, 903 (2014).
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IV- Legal Concepts of Human Agency as Functions
of Social Norms and Expectations - Their Past,
Present, and Future
What accounts for the behavioral divide between the U.S. and
the E.U., this striking difference in two so closely related legal and
economic orders? The remainder of this paper attempts to answer
this question, drawing on a range of historical, economic, and
political concepts and developments.
A. Explaining Different Degrees of Rationality in Legal
Concepts: From Economic to Behavioral
The degree of rationality inherent in concepts of human agency is
a social fact that relates to and is influenced by different paradigms
and norms endorsed by a society.74 Two such widely held social
beliefs seem to be driving the standard of rationality in the legal arena.
These two factors are not exhaustive.7 5 However, they seem to play a
decisive role in the determination of the overall degree of rationality of
legal concepts of human agency, Rs, in a given society s. Rs can thus
be modeled as a function of two distinct variables:
Rs = f (ts, cs).
The first variable, ts, denotes the trust a society places in market
forces and the self-organizing and self-stabilizing power of
uncoordinated human behavior. The more a society believes in the
factual working of these virtues, the more it will demand of
individuals to take care of their own destiny, reducing political and
legal intervention in the free exchange.76 A more exacting standard
in this regard, i.e., a higher score on ts, translates into a stronger
version of rationality.
The second variable, cs, reflects the degree to which each
individual in a given society is assigned a role in the construction of
74. Eugen Ehrlich, see supra note 11 (on social norms).
75. See infra, part IV.B: Objections and Omitted Variables.
76. Cf David Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 1 (2014).
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a cognitively demanding77 collective social project.7 8 If this project
necessitates circumspect behavior of the individual agent, the
standard of rationality will rise as well. Therefore, the function
describing the degree of rationality is monotonically increasing in
both variables. It suffices for a society to score high on any one of
the variables to engender a high level of rationality in legal analysis.
Naturally, a tentative analysis of the U.S. and the E.U. along
those two variables must remain fairly abstract and general.
However, such analysis explains the inverse tendencies observed and
generates testable predictions for the future evolution of Rs in both
the U.S. and the E.U.
1. Trust in the Self-Regulation of the Market by its
Participants: A Short Genealogy
The first variable, ts, the trust in the emancipatory and self-
regulating forces of unintended human behavior, usually develops in
cycles over time.79 However, the phases of the cycle in the U.S. and
the E.U., respectively, were out of sync during much of the second
half of the 20th century.
In the U.S., a high score on tus can be spotted during several
distinct historical periods. It can be traced both in political and in
market contexts80  as the belief in the beneficial outcome of
spontaneous, uncoordinated, and largely unregulated behavior.81
77. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans.,
1996) (it could be argued that every construction and stabilization of a democratic entity is,
in and of itself, cognitively demanding. For example on p. 322. Therefore, cs would map
those cognitive demands of collective social projects, which go beyond the strictures of
ordinary citizenry in a democratic state. I am indebted to Stefan Eich for raising this point.)
78. Cf also Vanessa Reichardt, Der Verbraucher und seine variable Rolle im
Wirtschaftsverkehr [THE CONSUMER AND ITS VARIABLE ROLE IN ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS]
156-57 (2008).
79. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 227 (2005).
80. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 210 (1991) (The link between these two
realms-the political and the market-is necessarily close and was present already in the
conception of the Republic the Federalists envisioned).
81. BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK
BENEFITS (F. B. Kaye ed., Clarendon Press, 1924) (1732) (the loci classici for such a theory
of private vices turned into public benefits); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book IV, Chapter II, Paragraph 9 (R. H.
Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., Oxford University Press, 1976) (1776); see DAVID SINGH
GREWAL, THE INVENTION OF THE ECONOMY (forthcoming, 2016) (tracing the intellectual
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This is not to say that, historically, the score was uniformly high.
However, a marked trust in self-regulation existed during the time of
the foundation of the U.S., the so-called Lochner era, and the years
dominated by the Chicago School. A belief in the empowerment of
the individual corresponded with the spirit of the American
Revolution82 and the U.S. Constitution during its enactment83 and
generally relates to the values of the enlightenment age:84 Men are
endowed with the freedom and power to shape their own existence. 85
The individual came to be considered the ultimate and best judge of
her own interest.86  After the American Civil War, this conviction
found striking articulation in the laissez-faire jurisprudence of the
history of this concept traced back to theological debates in the early modem period).
82. See, e.g, THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009) ("It has
been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country,
by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men
are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and
force.") This is not to deny that the relationship between direct popular rule and instituted
forms of government, between democratic participation, legal order and governmental
control is intricate and was perceived as such by the leaders of American Revolution.
However, on the whole, it seems justified to say that American Revolution was guided by a
spirit of empowerment of the people.
83. Michael A. Genovese, Introduction, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 1-2, 9 (Michael A.
Genovese ed., 2009) (noting that the U.S. constitution already in the moment of its birth
"placed full responsibility for the new government on the shoulders of the people" and that
inherent in it was the view that "humans [are] capable of some form or reason"); see also
the classical treatment by CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) (arguing that the founding fathers enacted a
constitution enshrining the value of private property and market exchange because they
themselves stood to benefit most from it); on Beard's claim see the insightful analyses in 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE. TRANSFORMATIONS 32-34 (1998); Robert E. Thomas, A
Reappraisal of Charles A. Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States, 57 AM. HIST. REV. 370 (1952); see generally ACKERMAN, supra note 80, 210-
11 (1991); but see also, for a fresh view on the founding fathers and a pro-regulation
interpretation of the Federalists, MAx M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF
GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
STATE (2003).
84. See William Bristow, Enlightenment, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2011 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2
011/entries/ enlightenment/, at 2.1.
85. Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aujkldrung?, AA VIII, 35 (the
famous definition of enlightenment as the emergence from self-imposed immaturity, given
by Immanuel Kant, epitomizes this conception of strong agency).
86. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in 18 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL
213, 223-24 (J. M. Robson ed., University of Toronto Press 1977) (1859) (this claim was
famously taken up by Mill's Harm Principle, which in turn influenced much regulatory
policy during the height of the Chicago School).
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late 19th century.7 It culminated in the majority ruling of the
Lochner case, which struck down mandatory restrictions on workers'
daily working hours. 88 During the Great Depression,89 trust in market
forces significantly decreased in the U.S., resulting in the socially
active legislation of the New Deal.90 However, once the spirit of the
New Deal vanished, the political and economic landscape started to
change again.91 Legal theory did not remain unaffected by it. As
Herbert Hovenkamp succinctly put it, speaking about the period
following the Great Depression:
A central question for legal theory became whether
social science and economics were consistent with
democratic policymaking, and promised legal
institutions that could facilitate growth and defensible
concepts of liberty, democratic participation, and
fairness. The initial attempt at a positive answer,
driven strongly by Legal Realist values, was a search
for nonmarket mechanisms of impartial policymaking.
When that quest failed, economists, legal scholars and
later policymakers increasingly returned to more
87. See Aziz Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 363-67
(2001).
88. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); on the controversy surrounding this opinion already in the
beginning of the 20th century, however, see Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1913) (claiming that Lochner was
atypical); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books andLaw in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15-16 (arguing
that Lochner represented well the spirit of the age); modem history of law supports Pound's
take, finding Lochner to be only one in a string of cases installing laissez-faire economics:
Aviam Soifer, The Paradox ofPaternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States
Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 249, 260 (1987); Huq, supra note 87, at 358;
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 1, 10-14 (2014); see generally ACKERMAN, supra note 83.
89. See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS. THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE
GREAT RECESSION, AND THE USES-AND MISUSES-OF HISTORY (2015) (for a review of the
Great Depression, and its connections to and differences from today's financial crises).
90. On this "constitutional moment," see ACKERMAN, supra note 83 (and particularly
401-02 on the repudiation of Lochner by the New Deal Court); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE. THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 17-18 (2014); more generally MORTON
KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990); Grewal & Purdy, supra note 88, at 12.
91. See, e.g., the adaptation of the Leaned Hand formula, as coined in Smith v. Staso
Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927), in the context of nuisance law in the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 826 (1939); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING
OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970 301-02 (2015).
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market-driven approaches.92
In regulatory law, unabated trust in the individual and in market
forces resurfaced with the advent of the Chicago School.9 3 This
conservative current of economic thinking, whose agenda responded
to the distinct political and social motivations of the 20th century,94
dominated U.S. economic and legal policy from, at the latest, the
1970s onward.95 Regulation was thought to be costly, ineffective,
and largely unnecessary.9 6 Thomas 0. McGarity has aptly termed
this period the "laissez faire revival." 9 7 Entrepreneurs and consumers
alike were entrusted to take their destiny into their own hands. Thus,
from these moments until very recently, the U.S. scored high on tus.
92. HOVENKAMP, supra note 91, at 299.
93. See, e.g., H. Laurence Miller, Chicago School of Economics, 70 J. PoL. EcON. 64,
65-67 (1962); Steven G. Medema, Chicago Law and Economics, in THE ELGAR COMPANION
TO THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 160 (Ross B. Emmett ed., 2010); Robert Pitofsky,
Introduction: Setting the Stage, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK. THE
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 3, 4-5 (Robert
Pitofsky, ed., 2008); F. M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK. THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 30 (Robert Pitofsky, ed., 2008); see also the attack on
insider trading in HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966);
Harold Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES I (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969); in
contract law, much of the deregulatory impetus derived from the so-called Coase Theorem,
a term coined by GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 116 (3rd ed., 1966) in
discussing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 5-6 (1960);
see, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 23-27 (1985)
(these antiregulatory tendencies were largely perpetuated in the new institutional economics
literature).
94. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics From the Perspective of Critical
Legal Studies, 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).
95. The revision of the FTC deception standard towards the reasonable consumer in the
DECEPTION STATEMENT was, e.g., pushed by then Chairman James B. Miller III, a fervent
adherent of Chicago economics: BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
AND BUSINESS TORTS 375 (2011); on the "rehabilitation of private markets" by the Chicago
School from the 1960s on, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 91, at 314-15.
96. A telling example is the shift in opinion of legal realist JAMES M. LANDIS, who after
initially defending regulation in THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) changed camps and
authored the REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (U.S.G.P.0,
1960) which was highly critical of the possibility and legitimacy of regulation of markets by
government agencies; see also STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 91, at 308-09, 319-320.
97. THOMAS 0. McGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ
FAIRE REVIVAL PART Ill (2013).
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It did not matter then that the absence of a supra-individual
normative role that would prescribe rational behavior indicated a low
score on cus.98 The trust in self-organization by market participants
was sufficient to lead to the standard model of rationality in law and
economics in the U.S. In fact, that trust accompanied the marked
distrust of political markets as advocated by scholars of public
choice:99 both evolved from a narrow economic framework as
applied to the study of economic markets and of politics,
respectively.
In Europe, laissez faire strategies also dominated both public and
private law during the second half of the 19th century.100 This
parallelism with U.S. developments, however, halted in the beginning
of the 20th century; after the violence and destruction of two world
wars fought on European soil, trust in the self-governing forces of
markets and human action was considerably dampened. Connected to
the writings of Karl Polanyi on the necessary embeddedness of the
economy,101 a branch of liberalism developed, foremost in Germany,
under the name of ordo-liberalism.10 2 It focused on grounding and
hedging the frailty of uncoordinated human behavior, in particular
markets, in a system of social welfare states.103 Antitrust law
illustrates this point: While early efforts to curb economic power
98. Eleanor Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714, 1716 (1986)
(summarizing the central claim of the Chicago economics movement that there almost never
is a higher social aim overriding individual freedom of action).
99. See, e.g., DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1948);
KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); JAMES BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see William C. Mitchell,
Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five Years of Public Choice and Political
Science, 56 PUB. CHOICE 101 (1988) (for an overview on public choice); id., Political
Science and Public Choice: 1950-70, 98 PUB. CHOICE 237 (1999); see RICHARD TUCK, FREE
RIDING (2008) (for an excellent treatment and refutation of Olson's thesis on the rationality
of free riding).
100. Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit [HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN
THE MODERN AGE] 479-82, 550 (2nd ed., 1967).
101. KARL POLANYi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (Beacon Press, 1944).
102. See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-
Liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COmp. L. 25 (1994).
103. Carl J. Friedrich, The Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
509, 510-512 (1955) (referring to ordo-liberalism by its other frequently employed name,
neo-liberalism, in his essay); Stephanie Lee Mudge, What is Neo-Liberalism, 6 SOCIO-ECON.
REV. 703,715 (2008).
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through the Sherman Act and related legislation subsided in the U.S.
in the late 1960s,104 Europe began to fully embrace antitrust law
during exactly that period.1o5 The economy, in Europe's view, had to
be politically instituted'06 and regulated.1 7 The revival of laissez faire
that so distinctly marked the U.S. intellectual climate from the 1960s
onward did not exert a decisive influence in Europe. Such a skeptical
perspective on the self-emancipatory forces of human behavior
stressed the disenfranchised and weak position of consumers.'0o The
low score on tEU led to less exacting consumer concepts in the second
half of the 20th century in Europe and particularly in Germany,
stressing her vulnerable nature.10 9
2. Cognitively Demanding Collective Social Projects:
The Construction of the Internal Market
However, the foundation of the European Community, which
ultimately led to the E.U.'s creation, marked a new era.110
Throughout the course of its establishment, the level of cEU rose
104. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 1836-1937 244-49
(1991) (on the Sherman Act and related legislation and adjudication); see Richard A.
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925-33 (1979)
(on the waning of regulatory antitrust analysis and the advent of the neoclassical,
deregulatory interpretation linked to the Chicago School); HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at
238-39.
105. Wolfgang Fikentscher, Wettbewerb und gewerblicher Rechtsschutz [COMPETITION
AND PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY] (1958).
106. See Karl Polanyi, The Economy As Instituted Process, TRADE AND MARKET IN THE
EARLY EMPIRES 243 (Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg & Harry W. Pearson eds., 1957).
107. WIEACKER, supra note 100, at 546-47.
108. See Josef Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers [THE
ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY OF THE CONSUMER] (1998) (for a careful account of consumer
sovereignty in a mildly ordo-liberal framework).
109. Cf Reichardt, supra note 78, at 158; cf Hans-Werner Micklitz, The Expulsion of
the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law and the Return of Social Elements in the
Civil Law: A Bittersweet Polemic, 35 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 283 (2012).
110. A similar story could possibly be told about the U.S. in the 19th century, where the
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, empowering Congress to regulate commerce
among the several states, also helped to forge a single market, albeit, as in the case of the
Sherman Act, a legally and socially controlled one. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 645-53 (1946); see
also Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982). Again, I am grateful to Stefan Eich for pushing me on this. However, the
construction of a single market nowadays is arguably less of a concern in the U.S. than in
the E.U.
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steadily. Joseph Weiler encapsulated this insight in the term
"politically messianic," which, according to him, distinguishes the
European political and legal project.1 In the areas of private and
public law, however, the driving pragmatic force into which this
messianic fervor was channeled has long been almost exclusively the
integration of the single market.112 The consumer was assigned a
crucial role in this endeavor.1 13 She had to be open for products from
different countries of origin, ready to compare them and attentive to
their differences.114 She had to be fit for the exactions of cross-border
trade." Taking heed of individual failure to live up to these
standards, i.e., of behavioral insights, could have, in the eyes of the
European project's designers, entrenched parochial product standards
and hampered cross-border trade. A boundedly rational consumer
concept would have provided Member States leverage to pass just
the kind of protective regulations the designers of the internal market
wished to eliminate. The active, adequately attentive, sufficiently
rational consumer was therefore perceived as a necessary premise for
the success of market integration at the heart of the European
111. Joseph H. H. Weiler, In the Face of Crisis: Input Legitimacy, Output Legitimacy
and the Political Messianism of European Integration, 34 EUR. INTEGRATION 825, 832-33
(2012) (Arguing that in "political 'messianism', the justification for action and its
mobilizing force derive not from process, as in classical democracy, or from result and
success, but from the ideal pursued, the destiny to be achieved, the 'Promised Land' waiting
at the end of the road. Indeed, in messianic visions the end always trumps the means", and
that "European integration [is] a politically messianic venture par excellence").
112. See Weiler, supra note 111 (Weiler himself has other values in mind when speaking
about political messianism, particularly peace and the construction of a common political
identity). However, the political reality for a long time restricted the project to an economic
union based on an internal (or single) market, see, e.g., Joseph H. H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2476-79 (1991); Stephen Weatherill, From
Economic Rights to Fundamental Rights, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
THE E.U. AFTER LISBON 11, 11-16 (Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz & Stephen Weatherill eds.,
2013). On the possible effects of the advent of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the
installation of European citizenship, see infra, note 169 and accompanying text.
113. See Micklitz, supra note 109, at 289: ("A single European market needs an active,
informed and adroit consumer; in short, one that is a normative optimized, omnipotent
consumer."); Sibony, supra note 73, at 903 ("Using [a rational consumer concept] as a
standard for the appraisal of unfair practices makes sense if the aim is to unify the internal
market."); cf also Anne-Lise Sibony & Genevieve Helleringer, E. U. Consumer Protection
and Behavioural Sciences: Revolution or Reform?, in NUDGE AND THE LAW. A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 209,214-19 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015).
114. See Lawrence W. Gormley, The Consumer Acquis and the Internal Market, 20
EUR. Bus. L. REV. 409, 417 (2009) (relating the functioning of the E.U. internal market to an
active consumer citizen).
115. Reichardt, supra note 78, at 156.
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project.1 6 As a leading textbook on E.U. law puts it:
The European consumer may be unused to diversity,
but the goals of the internal market are that she should
become used to this, and this means she will need to
become someone used to making decisions on the
basis of information, rather than having products
selected for her by the state. 17
It is not unreasonable to assume that this change in cEu has
precipitated the turn towards a more rational consumer concept in the
E.U.
What may explain, then, the inverse tendency in the U.S. in the
last two decades? A facile explanation would point to the financial
crisis and the problems it uncovered in the self-regulation of
markets."' While the financial crisis has certainly hastened the rise of
more boundedly rational concepts, it does not offer a sufficient
explanation. The turn toward behavioral law and economics had
started well before 2008.119 It rather seems to be the case that legal
discourse in the U.S. is generally more open and conducive to an
integration of insights from the behavioral and social sciences.120 This
116. See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, E.U. CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 175 (2005) (noting
that the E.C.J. uses "the informed consumer as a lever to achieve market integration"); see
also Hannes Unberath & Angus Johnston, The Double-Headed Approach of the E.CJ.
Concerning Consumer Protection, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1237, 1244 (2007) (noting that
consumer protection is a corollary to the development of an internal market); contra Sibony,
supra note 73, at 906 (arguing that the "closure of the [CJEU's] reasoning to behavioural
insights can therefore be viewed as more accidental than intentional.")
117. DAMIAN CHALMERS et al., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 769 (2d ed. 2010).
118. Cf e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure
Paradigm in European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform, 4 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L.
REV. 440 (2009); see, e.g., WOLFGANG FiKENTSCHER, PHILIPP HACKER & RUPPRECHT
PODSZUN, FAIRECONOMY: CRISES, CULTURE, COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF LAW (2013) (on
the case for global economic reform after the crisis).
119. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (the foundational paper of the discipline,
which could already draw on a host of preceding studies, dates from 1998).
120. This is apparent in the many "law & ... " subfields that have sprung up in the U.S.
and have found prominent spots in the curriculum of the leading law schools of the country
(contrary still to most European law schools); cf also Richard A. Posner, The Decline of
Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REV. 761 (1987); Michael
Abramowicz, lan Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 929 (2011);
Sunstein, supra note 3.
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sensitivity vis-d-vis the empirical sciences explains why the score of
tus, the actual trust in the self-organizing forces of human behavior,
was lowered from its Chicago heights to an empirically grounded
level. Despite the fact that the debate on the uncertainty surrounding
the interpretation of empirical data has not been finally resolved,1 2 1
heuristics and biases literature has generated enough cracks in the
rational framework of human agency to substantially lower the level
of tus. With this, the turn from a more economic to a more behavioral
approach1 2 2 had been achieved in the U.S. The divergence between
the U.S. and the E.U. can thus be attributed to a greater inclination to
scientific empiricism in U.S. legal scholarship and practice, and a
greater collective idealism of its E.U. pendant.12 3
B. Objections and Omitted Variables
As in every model, several factors had to be left out to explain
the differences between the U.S. and the E.U. regarding behavioral
law and economics. Three particularly noteworthy ones shall be
briefly discussed here: the role of mandatory risk regulation; the
specific political economy of behaviorally informed legal concepts,
especially of nudging; and differences in legal education.1 2 4
121. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 42; Hacker, supra note 41.
122. To reiterate, "economic" in this particular context is meant to denote a form of
economic thinking indebted to the neoclassical rational actor model, which is the traditional
and still probably dominant form of economic thought today in Western societies; see supra
notes 8-9, also on the term "behavioral."
123. I am grateful to Stefan Grundmann for discussing this point with me.
124. A fourth and highly intriguing omitted variable, which cannot be adequately
discussed here, is the distinction between U.S. consumerism and European producerism, as
analyzed beautifully by James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in
Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007). However, in our context, what is at stake is
possibly rather the specific color of consumerism (behavioral or rational), and less the
consumerism-producerism distinction. As Whitman says: "[E]ven if European law embraces
the primacy of consumer identity (as it may well do), it will not necessarily embrace the
American approach. [ ... ] But one can embrace consumer identity without embracing
consumer economic interest. Consumer legislation can also take the form of consumer
protection legislation, and that is exactly the kind of legislation that we are receiving more
and more of at the hands of European lawmakers." (ib., at 402). Well put.
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1. Mandatory Risk Regulation
It may be argued that one reason for the relative reluctance of
many Member States of the E.U. and of the E.U. as a whole to fully
embrace behavioral law and economics, and boundedly rational
concepts of human agency, lies in the robust role mandatory risk
regulation plays.125 While mandatory regulation is less frequent in
the U.S., 1 2 6 many of the concerns, the argument would go, that a
more behavioral concept of human agency attempts to address are
already covered by mandatory E.U. or national legislation.12 7 For
example, Regulation 765/2008128 establishes a system of market
surveillance that is designed to monitor, to report, and, in cases of
imminent danger, to prevent the distribution of perilous products in
the E.U.1 29
125. 1 am indebted to Georgios Dimitropoulos and Stefan Grundmann for raising this
point.
126. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product
Safety Regulation, 28 J. L. & ECON. 527 (1985); Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation
in the European Union and the United States: Diferent Cultures, Different Laws, 4 CoLUM.
J. EUR. L. 525 (1998); Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 119, at 1505-06 (discussing
mandatory contract terms); Schwartz, supra note 42, at 1375-76, 1384-85.
127. See, e.g., Recital 8 of the Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety, 2002 O.J. (L 11) 4: "The safety
of products should be assessed taking into account all the relevant aspects, in particular the
categories of consumers which can be particularly vulnerable to the risks posed by the
products under consideration, in particular children and the elderly." On E.U. product safety
regulation, see, e.g., ELLEN Vos, INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF COMMUNITY HEALTH AND
SAFETY LEGISLATION: COMMITTEES, AGENCIES, AND PRIVATE BODIES (1999); KAI
PURNHAGEN, THE POLITICS OF THE SYSTEMATIZATION IN E.U. PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION:
MARKET, STATE, COLLECTIVITY, AND INTEGRATION (2013); Alberto Alemanno, Regulating
the European Risk Society, in BETTER BUSINESS REGULATION IN A RISK SOCIETY 37 (Alberto
Alemanno, Frank den Butter, Andr6 Nijsen & Jacopo Torriti eds., 2013); Geraint Howells,
Product Safety - A Model for E. U. Legislation and Reform, VARIETIES OF ECONOMIC LAW
AND REGULATION 525 (Kai Purnhagen & Peter Rott eds., 2014).
128. Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9
July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to
the marketing of products, 2008 O.J. (L 218) 30; see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PRODUCT
SAFETY AND MARKET SURVEILLANCE PACKAGE 2013 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, Memo,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-93_en.htm (for new proposals by the
Commission).
129. On the system of market surveillance of goods and the concomitant information
system RAPEX, see, e.g., Georgios Dimitropoulos, Zertifizierung und Akkreditierung im
internationalen Verwaltungsverbund [CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION IN INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSOCIATIONS] 117-123 (2011).
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However, mandatory regulation does not adequately cover all
risks.130 It can only provide a basic security level, beyond which
private law liability regimes step in. Pointing at differences in
mandatory rules between the E.U. and the U.S. therefore misses the
biggest part of the picture.
A helpful example stems from a case decided by a German
regional court.131 The fact pattern runs as follows: 13 2 A machine for
kneading polyvinyl chloride (PVC) became stuck for unknown
reasons. The operating manual for this event described a specific
routine of opening the machine using special screws provided with
the machine. However, the screws got lost in the factory in which the
plaintiff was working. The plaintiff thus set the machine in motion
to heat the PVC and to open the machine without the special screws.
This tactic led to an unnaturally elevated pressure level inside the
machine. Because the machine still failed to open, the plaintiff
mounted the machine in disregard of the instruction manual's
warnings. The warnings specified one could not be within reach of
machine parts that could swing open when trying to open the
machine. While the plaintiff stood on the machine, a part of it
suddenly yielded to the pressure and burst open, severely injuring the
plaintiff. The court denied recovery and stated the clear instructions
and warnings were sufficient to prevent the product from being
defective, for following the instructions would have prevented the
accident. 133
No E.U. regulation prescribed a level of robustness of the PVC
machine sufficient to protect the mechanic from his perilous actions.
Instead, the case turned on the standard of rationality embodied in
product liability; in the E.U., the mechanic is barred from recovery
because he is assumed to heed the product warning. By contrast,
when an almost identical fact pattern concerned a car mechanic (Mr.
Martinez) in the United States, that mechanic was awarded a double-
digit million dollar amount of compensation because the court
assumed a simple warning would likely not be heeded and would
130. On the increasing erosion of mandates by nudges, see Jeff King, Why Not Nudge?,
Verfassungsblog, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/not-nudge/; Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5.
131. OLG Koblenz NJW-RR 169 (170), 2006; a host of other European cases in the
same vein can be found in Hacker, supra note 7.
132. Hacker, supra note 7, at 336-37 (the following example draws on Hacker).
133. OLG Koblenz NJW-RR 169 (171), 2006.
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thus be insufficient to shield the manufacturer from liability. 134
Therefore, while divergent levels of mandatory risk regulation may
account for some differences between the U.S. and the E.U., they fail
to capture the difference in legal concepts of human agency, which
precisely kick in if and when mandatory regulation fails.
2. The Political Economy of Nudging
A second objection points to the specific political economy of
nudging.13 5 As is well-known, the nudge movement,136 promoting a
boundedly rational concept of human agency, received a boost from
two decisive factors. First, President Obama was appointed in early
2009.137 He appointed Cass Sunstein to head the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), the most important
regulatory agency in the U.S. Sunstein, a co-founder of the nudge
movement,138 launched a host of regulatory interventions modeled on
the bounded rationality paradigm.'3 9 Second, the U.S. political
landscape proved quite responsive to the nudge approach because it
seemed to offer a third option beyond traditional disclosure policies
(favored by Republicans) and traditional mandatory regimes (favored
by Democrats).140  During a fierce national political divide in the
U.S. and a gridlock in U.S. political institutions,14 1 the "soft"
approach of nudging seemed to uniquely advance progressive
134. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., supra, note 55.
135. For an intriguing discussion of the politics of behavioral law and economics/nudging,
see Christopher McCrudden, Nudging and Human Dignity, VERFASSUNGSBLOG, http://ww
w.verfassungsblog.de/nudging-human-dignity/; Hans-W. Micklitz, The Politics ofBehavioural
Economics (Working Paper, Jan. 15, 2015) (on file with author).
136. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE (2008); CAsS SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? (2014).
137. On his influence, see, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Liberalism and Lifestyle:
Informing Regulatory Governance with Behavioural Research, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 17, 17
(2012).
138. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 136.
139. See Sunstein, supra note 3.
140. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 138 (this is consistently offered as a main
advantage by behavioral law and economics scholars); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein,
Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 208 (2006); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note
136, at 4-6, 13-14; Sunstein & Thaler,supra note 136, at 4-7.
141. Cf Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 136, at 5.
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politiCS14 2 in a country in which widespread support of libertarian
ideals14 3 still prevents most openly "paternalistic" initiatives from
commencing.14 4 A less politically divided and less libertarian E.U.,
the conclusion might run, would therefore be more reluctant to adopt
the bounded rationality paradigm; it might not need the political,
bipartisan (in a U.S. sense) legitimation of adhering to choice
preservation.14 5
However, while the brief sketch of the political economy
underpinning the nudge project partly explains the boost of the nudge
movement in recent years, is does not account for all of its success. It
certainly does not explain the entire move toward behavioral law and
economics in the U.S. Norman Silber, for example, advocated a more
behavioral approach to consumer concepts in as early as 1989.146
Howard Latin published his seminal article on behavioral product
liability in 1994.147 And the foundational essay on general behavioral
law and economics authored by Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and
Richard Thaler came out in 1998.148 The turn towards boundedly
rational legal concepts of human agency more than predates President
Obama's term of office. It started during the Bush senior and Bill
Clinton presidencies; thus, it arguably began before the political divide
in the U.S. and political institutions' gridlock were intensely felt as an
irreversible datum of contemporary U.S. politics. Political economy
theories, for all their merit, therefore cannot sufficiently explain the
behavioral divide's genesis.
142. McCrudden, supra note 135 (Political Economy of Nudging); Feldman & Lobel,
Behavioral Tradeoffs: Beyond the Land ofNudges Spans the World ofLaw and Psychology,
NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 301, 306-07 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-
Lise Sibony eds., 2015).
143. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (for a foundational text
of libertarianism); see Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism without Foundations. Anarchy, State,
and Utopia by Robert Nozick, 85 YALE L.J. 136 (1975) (for a critical perspective); Jeffrey H.
Reiman, The Fallacy of Libertarian Capitalism, 92 ETHICS 85 (1981); see James W. Child,
Can Libertarianism Sustain a Fraud Standard?, 104 ETHICS 722 (1994) (for a critical
perspective on libertarian approaches to the law).
144. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 5.
145. Choice preservation is equally central in nudging, and behaviorally informed
concepts in general; see Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 140.
146. Norman I. Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers: Cognitive Psychology,
Consumer Behavior and Consumer Law, 2 Lov. CONSUMER L. REP. 69 (1989).
147. Latin, supra note 52.
148. See Jolls, supra note 119.
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3. Differences in Legal Education
Finally, differences in legal education may explain the
differential integration of social science data into the legal
framework. Ever since Roscoe Pound's invective against "legal
monks,"l4 9 all U.S. legal scholars have an undergraduate education in
a nonlegal field' and sometimes even hold a Ph.D. in economics,
mathematics, or psychology. European lawyers, in contrast, tend to
have studied nothing but the law. Grechenig and Gelter, in their
attempt to explain the greater relevance of law and economics in the
U.S., point inter alia to these educational divergences.,5 ' It is
tempting to conclude in a similar fashion that the stronger social
scientific background of at least a relevant part of the American
lawyers caused the surge in behavioral analyses of law, by endowing
them with the methods, vocabulary, and interest necessary for the
reception of social science scholarship.
However, it would be wrong to fully credit differences in legal
education with the emergence of the behavioral divide. What can be
noted, as mentioned above,15 2 is a greater sensitivity of U.S. legal
scholarship to interdisciplinary trends and methods. This tendency can
partly be explained by the specificities of U.S. legal education.15 3
What remains a puzzle in this reading, however, is why E.U. lawyers
have been so keen to adopt a very particular interdisciplinary concept,
i.e., a narrow version of rational choice theory, including a clearly
economic, nonlegal concept of rational human agency.154 This move
149. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 36 (1910).
150. See ROBERT BOCKING STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 134-141 (1982) (on the history of the introduction of social
sciences into the U.S. law school system from roughly 1910 on).
151. Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal
Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 295, 305-05 (2008); see also Robert Cooter & James Gordley, Economic
Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present, Future, 11 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 261, 262
(1991); Wolfgang Weigel, Prospects for Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries:
Austria, 11 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 325, 326-27 (1991); Ugo Mattei & Roberto Pardolesi, Law
and Economics in Civil Law Countries: A Comparative Approach, 11 INT'L REV. L. ECON.
265, 271 (1991).
152. See supra, part 0, at the very end.
153. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 91 (for a detailed analysis of the emergence of the
interdisciplinary nature of U.S. law); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HAR. L. R. 761 (1987).
154. See Hacker, supra note 7 (for a more detailed analysis of this development).
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transcends and remains unexplained by the facile dichotomy of U.S.
interdisciplinarity and E.U. doctrinalism155  resulting from legal
education.
The three omitted variables reviewed-mandatory risk
regulation, the political economy of nudging, and differences in legal
education-therefore are all far from irrelevant in explaining the
behavioral divide. However, decisive reasons for the divide can be
found elsewhere. While there is much to be said, for example, about
the specific political economy of the recent "nudge revolution,"156
deeper sources of the move toward behaviorally inspired, boundedly
rational concepts of human agency exist. They can be traced to the
confluence of political, scientific, and legal discourses constituting
the undercurrent that shapes legal interpretation and lawmaking
alike-the trust in market forces and the strictures of cognitively
demanding collective social projects.
C. The Future of Legal Concepts of Human Agency
in the U.S. and the E.U.
It is tempting to suggest that, as the E.U. becomes more divided
between right-wing anti-European movements and central as well as
progressive forces attempting to construct an "ever closer union," the
European political climate may increasingly resemble the U.S. by
edging toward a greater political divide.157 If such political economy
analysis is right, one would expect to see more nudging interventions
at the E.U level in the future-signs of which are already beginning
to show within the Commission.158 On a different level, the political
155. See Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 151 (for an elaboration of the dichotomy).
156. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 142.
157. See Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation ofEurope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,2476
(1991) (on the relative absence of ideological debate in the late 1980s and early 90s in the
E.U., even during the deliberation of the Maastricht Treaty).
158. See, e.g., Ren6 van Bavel, et al., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL
SCIENCES To E.U. POLICY-MAKING, JCR SCIENTIFIC & POLICY REPORTS, EUR 26033 EN 3
(2013); the information provided on the DG SANCO's website, at http://ec.eur opa.eu/cons
umers/consumerevidence/behaviouralresearch/index en.htm; Commission, Guidance on
the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices,
Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2009) 1666 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consu
mer-marketing/files/ucpguidance en.pdf, at 32 (sec. 4.2.4); COMMISSION & DECISION
TECHNOLOGY LTD., CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING IN RETAIL INVESTMENT SERVICES: A
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE, Final Report, November 2010, http://ec.europa.e
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climate in many E.U. Member States suffers from a similar
polarization of political attitudes in the wake of the Euro Crisis and
amidst the Refugee Crisis. Similarly, this could spur greater recourse
to behavioral strategies at the Member State level. Indeed, some
regulatory agencies have recently started to base some of their
strategies and actions on behavioral insights. The U.K., the home of
the Behavioural Insights Team,15 9 unsurprisingly takes the lead with
its Financial Conduct Authority,160 but agencies from countries such
as Germany,I6 ' France,62 and the Netherlands163 also show tentative
behavioral beginnings. The political economy therefore cannot
u/consumers/archive/strategy/docs/final report en.pdf; see also Anne-Lise Sibony, Can
E. U. Consumer Law Benefit from Behavioural Insights? An Analysis of the Unfair Practices
Directive, 22 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 901, 905-06 (2014); for an incipient introduction of
behavioral insights into Commission decisions, see Microsoft, COMP/C-3/37.792232recita
1870 (2004); Microsoft (Tying), COMP/C-3/39.530 10-12 (2009); Joaquin Almunia,
Statement on the Google investigation, Feb. 5, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releas
eSPEECH-14-93_en.htm.
159. Katrin Bennhold, Britain's Ministry of Nudges, N.Y. TIMES, December 7, 2013;
DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS & BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, BETTER
CHOICES: BETTER DEALS. CONSUMERS POWERING GROWTH (2011), http://www.datagoverno
r.co.uk/styled-4/downloads/files/better-choices-better-deals.pdf; BEHAVIOURALINSIGHTS TEAM,
APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TO REDUCE FRAUD, ERROR AND DEBT (2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/60539/BITFra
udErrorDebtaccessible.pdf.
160. FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AT THE
FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, Occasional Paper No. 1 (2013), http://www.fca.or g.uk/sta
tic/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-i.pdf; FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY,
How DOES SELLING INSURANCE AS AN ADD-ON AFFECT CONSUMER DECISIONS? A PRACTICAL
APPLICATION OF BEHAVIOURAL EXPERIMENTS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION, Occasional Paper
No. 3 (2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-pape rs/occasional-paper-
3.pdf.
161. Alexander Neubacher, Alchemie im Kanzleramt [Alchemy in the Chancellery], Der
Spiegel, September 1, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-128977553.html.
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see iNudgeyou, http://inudgeyou.com/about/projects/ (in Denmark, a bottom-up initiative has
sprung up among academics); see Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony, Epilogue: The
Legitimacy and Practicability of E. U. Behavioral Policymaking, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A
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properly explain the genesis of the behavioral divide. But if the
political divide of the E.U. increases, it will more greatly impact the
E.U.'s future.
Apart from these political vicissitudes, two debates will likely
dominate the fate of legal concepts of human agency in the U.S and
the E.U. In the U.S., the discourse will revolve primarily around the
consequences of the empirical results for tus. The debate surrounding
the knowledge problem points in this direction.164 The main question
is whether the evidence gathered by psychological and economic
research is consistent enough to legitimately and continuously
displace the assumption of strong forms of rationality. The issue is
primarily a descriptive one. In the E.U., another debate arises atop
the descriptive one: Will the importance of the European project's
continuation, and the perceived conflict between the project's aims
and bounded rationality, lead to a normatively motivated failure to
integrate social science research into the framework of legal analysis
as practiced by the CJEU, national courts, and government agencies?
Or will the E.U. come to reconcile the construction of an internal
market, founded less on formal and more on material autonomy,165
with behavioral insights?16 6 Or will the E.U., spurred by the passage
of the now binding Charter of Fundamental Rights 16 7 and the
introduction of the European citizenship,168 step beyond market
164. See Rizzo Whitman, supra note 45.
165. See Philipp Hacker, Rethinking Autonomy. A Philosophical and Legal Critique, in
CONSUMER RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Hans-W. Micklitz, Kai Purnhagen & Anne-Lise Sibony
eds., forthcoming 2016) (on a behaviorally informed, materialized concept of autonomy).
166. See Sibony & Helleringer, supra note 117 (on these prospects).
167. See, e.g., Weatherill, supra note 112, at 22-36 (on some of the hopes and normative
shifts related to the Charter of Fundamental Rights); Sybe de Vries, The Protection of
Fundamental Rights within Europe's Internal Market after Lisbon - An Endeavor for More
Harmony, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE E.U. AFTER LISBON 59
(Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2013); Xavier Groussot, Laurent
Pech & Gunnar Thor Petursson, The Reach ofFundamental Rights on Member State Action
after Lisbon, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE E.U. AFTER LISBON 97
(Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2013).
168. See, e.g., MARC MORJt HOWARD, THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE 196-205
(2009); IRENEUSZ PAWEL KAROLEWSKI, CITIZENSHIP AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN EUROPE
(2010); Anne Muxel, E.U. Movers and Politics: Towards a Fully-Fledged European
Citizenship?, in PIONEERS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. CITIZENSHIP AND MOBILITY IN THE
E.U. 156 (Ettore Recchi & Adrian Favell eds., 2009); Henri de Waele, E. U. Citizenship:
Revisiting its Meaning, Place, and Potential, 12 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 319 (2010);
Dimitry Kochenov, A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel
Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55 (2011).
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integration as the overriding aim, perhaps even of economic law?'6 9
In the U.S. and the E.U., observers are thus bound to witness
intellectual battles on multiple fronts.
V. Conclusion
European academia is swiftly and increasingly embracing the
behavioral analysis of law, a form of legal theory drawing on
cognitive psychology and experimental economics that currently
dominates much U.S. legal culture. Adjudication by European courts
and regulatory agencies, however, starkly contrasts this
interdisciplinary uptake. While adjudication in the U.S. progressively
and openly embraces behavioral economics (the "more behavioral
approach"), the European judicial landscape increasingly clings to a
neoclassical rational actor paradigm (the "more economic approach").
This behavioral divide, analyzed in depth in a companion paper,1 7 0 can
be traced in the development of legal concepts of human agency
employed in U.S. and E.U. law, i.e., those elements of a legal order
that, implicitly or explicitly, refer to models of rationality in human
actors.
This paper claims that the behavioral divide can best be explained
by a theory of social norms and expectations. Two decisive factors are
uncovered: first, the trust a society places in the self-ordering forces of
uncoordinated individual behavior (ts); and second, the degree to
which each individual is supposed to contribute to a cognitively
demanding collective social project (cs), such as the construction of an
internal market in the E.U. A high score on either variable in this
model leads to the adoption of a more rational concept of human
agency.
Historical changes in the social norms and expectations expressed
by these variables can be credited for the inverse tendencies in the
U.S. and the E.U. The second half of the 20th century, particularly
from the late 1960s onward, saw diverging scores for ts and c s in the
U.S. and the E.U. In the U.S., tus was high and cus was low at that
169. Max Fabian Starke, Market Logics of E. U. Fundamental Rights in Contract Law
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) (as Max Fabian Starke points out, however, the
CJEU tends to interpret fundamental rights in private law within a framework of market
logic, evicting much of their political and progressive content).
170. Hacker, supra note 7.
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time, leading to a highly rational model of human agency. However,
as tus has decreased in recent years due to behavioral scholarship,
while cus has remained low, more bounded concepts of rationality
have gradually displaced full rationality in legal domains. In the
E.U., by contrast, both teu and ceu were fairly low after the Second
World War. However, while teu remained low, ceu soared as the
European Union took shape, leading to an increasingly rational legal
concept of human agency.
Arguably, the more individualistic social conception of the U.S.
leads to a greater sensitivity to empirical, i.e., behavioral, findings
about individual decision making. By contrast, the European political
project has long been driven by the construction of an "ever closer
union" on the basis of a single market. If the model presented here is
correct, U.S. court and government agency decisions can be expected
to track more closely empirical findings about the respective
cognitive strength or frailty of human nature. Conversely, the focus
on the construction of an internal market is primarily responsible for
the so far diminished significance of bounded rationality in legal
analysis in the E.U. If the E.U., despite the recent shocks of the euro
crisis, sticks to its paradigm of market integration as the key feature
of the European project, this could significantly inhibit the long-term
prospects of behavioral law and economics in Europe.
Other factors, such as diverging rules of mandatory risk
regulation, a distinct political economy analysis of nudging, and
differences in legal education, play a potentially significant but not
decisive role in the explanation of the behavioral divide. However,
the specific political economy of behavioral law and economics-
based on bridging otherwise insurmountable political differences in
times of institutional political gridlock-may well prove a potent
force if the E.U. continues on its deplorable path to an ever greater
political and ideological divide. Such a "political divide" may cut
against the current move toward more rational legal concepts of
human agency in the E.U., and it may eventually mitigate the
behavioral divide. Some behavioral beginnings within the E.U.
Commission and at Member States' regulatory agencies may thus be
seen as harbingers of a potential behavioral turn in the E.U. in the
wake of a growing political divide.
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